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I. INTRODUCTION
Congressional findings underlying the Child Pornography
Prevention Act of 1996 state that child sexual abusers often use child
pornography to “stimulate and whet their own sexual appetites.” 2
Possession of child pornography and the act of child molestation are
separate crimes; however, contemporary studies have highlighted a
correlation between the principal behaviors of both. 3 Recent federal
appellate court decisions have resulted in divergent holdings, some of
which are inconsistent with these studies. 4 These decisions affect the
federal circuit courts by blurring the threshold used to determine when
probable cause under the Fourth Amendment is established in cases
involving evidence of child sexual exploitation crimes.5
The Eighth Circuit held in United States v. Colbert that evidence of
defendant’s attempt to entice a young girl supported probable cause to
search defendant’s home for child pornography.6 The court found that
probable cause existed because “individuals sexually interested in
children frequently utilize child pornography to reduce the inhibitions of
their victims.”7 Contrary to the decision in Colbert, the Sixth Circuit
found in United States v. Hodson that an affidavit, based on defendant’s
2 Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–208, § 121, 110 Stat.
3009–26 (1996).
3 See Michael L. Bourke & Andres E. Hernandez, The ‘Butner Study’ Redux: A
Report of the Incidence of Hands-on Child Victimization by Child Pornography
Offenders, 24 J. Fam. Violence 183 (2009).
4 See, e.g., Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2011); United States
v. Colbert, 605 F.3d 573 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 1469 (2011); United
States v. Hodson, 543 F.3d 286 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d
Cir. 2008).
5 Id.
6 Colbert, 605 F.3d at 577.
7 Id.
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online confession to an undercover officer that he had an attraction to
children and that he had sexually molested a seven-year-old boy, was not
sufficient to support probable cause to search the defendant’s home for
child pornography. 8 Similarly, the Second Circuit in United States v.
Falso held that a search for child pornography was not supported by
probable cause where the affidavit was based, in part, on evidence that
the defendant had previously been arrested for sexually abusing a minor.9
Finally, and most recently, in Dougherty v. City of Covina, the Ninth
Circuit advanced this split among the federal appellate courts by siding
with the Second and Eighth Circuits.10 The Dougherty court held that
although the affidavit included one allegation of attempted molestation
of a student and multiple allegations of inappropriate touching of
students, it did not contain any facts linking the defendant’s acts as a
possible child molester to his possession of child pornography.11 Thus, a
search of the defendant’s home for child pornography was not supported
by probable cause.12
These cases illustrate a pressing dilemma: the absence of a brightline rule to determine when evidence of child molestation can be used to
support probable cause to search a defendant’s home for child
pornography. A vague totality of the circumstances test leads to
probable cause being found in some instances, yet not found in many
other similar instances.13 When probable cause cannot directly link the
two crimes, defendants and law enforcement are faced with uncertainty
and confusion. This presents a compelling problem due to the inherently
dangerous nature of the two crimes. Conversely, adopting a bright-line
rule that links the two crimes in the absence of direct evidence or
sufficient probable cause may be problematic, given the United States
Supreme Court’s reluctance to invade “legitimate expectations of
privacy” protected by the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.14 Grappling with and reconciling these conflicting issues is
the underlying theme of this Comment.
8

Hodson, 543 F.3d at 292.
Falso, 544 F.3d at 121–24.
10 Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2011).
11 Id. at 898–99.
12 Id. at 899.
13 Compare United States v. Adkins, 169 F. App’x 961, 967 (6th Cir. 2006)
(“Standing alone, a high incidence of child molestation by persons convicted of child
pornography crimes may not demonstrate that a child molester is likely to possess child
pornography.”), with United States v. Haynes, 160 F. App’x 940 (11th Cir. 2005)
(holding a police officer’s belief that probable cause of child molestation supported a
search for child pornography was objectively reasonable, based on no more than common
sense).
14 See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983).
9
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Law enforcement face significant obstacles in detecting child abuse
crimes. Two such impediments are the growing technology of the
Internet and the ever-increasing ways that child pornographers can hide
images.15 Traditional investigative techniques have become less useful
at preventing the victimization of innocent children.16 Additionally, the
crime of Internet child pornography does not coincide neatly with
traditional Fourth Amendment precedent. Internet child pornographers
walk a fine line between enjoying individual liberties in the privacy of
their home and conducting criminal activity.17 Consequently, the best
response by the judiciary to combat the societal danger of child
pornography has been to engage in different forms of balancing tests.18
As evidenced by the current circuit split, an unguided judicial balancing
test that accords inconsistent weights to different types of evidence
regarding child sexual exploitation crimes is too subjective to serve as a
reliable decision-making formula. 19 To determine whether probable
cause exists to support a search for child pornography, courts, law
enforcement, and society as a whole need a more lucid standard.
The optimal solution is to emulate the broadened probable cause
standard used in obtaining search warrants relating to drug crimes.20 In
certain cases, courts loosened the probable cause standard by considering
the background and training of the investigating affiant, the severity of
the crime, the availability of reliable statistics, and the nexus between the
crime and the particular place to be searched.21 If evidence of certain
child sexual exploitation crimes may be used as evidence indicating that
a suspect possesses child pornography, then search warrants may be
granted on more consistent grounds. This expanded standard will serve
15 Kenneth V. Lanning, Child Molesters: A Behavioral Analysis, National Center for
Missing & Exploited Children, 92 (5th Ed. 2010), available at
http://www.missingkids.com/en_US/publications/NC70.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2011).
16 Id.
17 See Ellen S. Podgor, Computer Crime Facts, (2002) Encyclopedia of Crime and
Justice, http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Computer_Crime.aspx (“The availability and
dissemination of pornography is exacerbated by technology. The accessibility of
pornography via the Internet is a concern of the Communications Decency Act of 1996
and the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (18 U.S.C. § 2251 et. seq., 18 U.S.C.
§ 2242(b)). These statutes and others have been added to the criminal code to provide
additional protections to children. When reviewing these statutes, courts have the
difficult task of determining the appropriate line between individual liberties, such as
privacy and free speech, and criminal conduct.”).
18 See supra note 4.
19 See supra note 4.
20 See United States v. Feliz, 182 F.3d 82 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Pace, 955
F.2d 270 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Freeman, 685 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Charest, 602 F.2d 1015 (1st Cir. 1979); See discussion infra Part IV, B.
21 Supra note 20.
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as a concrete guidepost for the judiciary, law enforcement personnel, and
society, and has the potential to be used as prima facie proof that a
questionable search is in fact reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
This Comment proceeds in three parts. Part II details the history
and growth of child pornography and sexual abuse of children. This
section describes the historical development of child pornography laws,
as well as the historical progression of the Fourth Amendment. Part III
discusses the current debate on the correlation between child
pornography and child molestation, and how this problem affects the
federal circuit courts. By focusing on an in-depth analysis of recent
circuit court cases, this Comment specifically targets issues in
developing probable cause to search for child pornography.
Part IV identifies the ideal solution to this problem, positing that
child pornography is a form of child abuse and, as such, a different, more
expansive probable cause standard should be developed. This section
suggests a new, expanded approach to determining probable cause in
situations involving evidence of child sexual exploitation. Part IV also
examines the practical ramifications of implementing the proposed
broadened probable cause standard. Lastly, this section argues that by
mildly conflating evidence of child sexual exploitation crimes, the
proposed probable cause standard will alleviate confusion and
inconsistencies when determining whether probable cause exists.
II. BACKGROUND
A. History of Pornography in General
Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure, the first pornographic novel
written in the English language, was published in 1748. 22
Notwithstanding the reserved public attitude toward sex at that time, the
novel left little to the imagination by delving into racy topics, such as
bisexuality, voyeurism, group sex, and masochism. 23 Pornographers
were exposed to unparalleled innovation with the advent of photography
in 1839.24 Video followed a similar groundbreaking path.25 By 1896,
French filmmakers were exploring pornography in short, silent films like
Le Coucher de la Marie, which featured a strip tease.26 The cultural and
22 The History of Pornography No More Prudish Than the Present, FOXNEWS.COM
(Oct. 13, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/health/2010/10/13/history-pornographyprudish-present/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2012) [hereinafter History of Pornography].
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
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sexual revolution of the 1960s and 1970s led to evolving social attitudes
that cleared the way for more widespread screenings of explicit films.27
The subsequent development of both the Internet and the digital camera
reduced impediments to making, viewing, and distributing
pornography. 28 Today, while pornography continues to inundate the
Internet, the actual size of the industry remains a mystery.29
B. Setting the Stage for Conflict: Efforts to Criminalize Child
Pornography
In 1973, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the First
Amendment’s guarantee of Freedom of Speech did not protect obscene
material.30 In Miller v. California, the Court acknowledged that because
there are fundamental dangers in trying to regulate any form of
expression statutes regulating obscene materials must be narrowly
drawn. 31 In an attempt to set such limits, the Court defined obscene
material as that which, when “taken as a whole, appeal[s] to the prurient
interest in sex,” is patently offensive in light of community standards,
and lacks “serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”32
Congress’s first step toward protecting children from child
pornography occurred with the enactment of the Federal Protection of
Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act in 1978. 33 This legislation
prohibited showcasing children under the age of sixteen in sexually
explicit material to be distributed in interstate commerce, which helped
regulate the commercial exchange of child pornography. 34 Five years
later, the Court in New York v. Ferber upheld the criminalization of the
distribution and sale of non-obscene child pornography. 35 The Court
found that child pornography could be banned without first being
deemed “obscene” under Miller for five reasons: (1) the government has
a compelling interest in “safeguarding the physical and psychological
well-being of a minor” by preventing the sexual exploitation and abuse
of children;36 (2) child pornography distribution is intrinsically related to
27

The History of Pornography, supra note 22.
Id.
29 Id.
30 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973).
31 Id. at 23–24.
32 Id. at 24.
33 Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95225, § 2252(a), 92 Stat. 7, 7-8 (1978) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1994)).
34 Amy E. Wells, Comment, Criminal Procedure: The Fourth Amendment Collides
with the Problem of Child Pornography and the Internet, 53 OKLA. L. REV. 99, 102
(2000).
35 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756 (1982).
36 Id.
28
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child sexual abuse; 37 (3) commercializing child pornography provides
economic incentive for its production;38 (4) visual depictions of children
engaged in sexual activity have negligible artistic value; 39 and (5)
recognizing that child pornography falls outside the protection of the
First Amendment is compatible with Supreme Court precedent. 40
Subsequently, in 1984, Congress passed the Child Protection Act, 41
which increased the legal age of a minor to eighteen and abolished the
commercial transaction requirement. 42 Finally, due to emerging
technologies, in 1988 Congress passed the Child Protection and
Obscenity Enforcement Act,43 which prohibited the distribution of child
pornography by means of computers.44
Following these important legislative actions, the Supreme Court,
in 1990, extended its holding in Ferber and upheld state criminal
sanctions for the private possession of child pornography. 45 By
outlawing such possession, the government sought to eliminate genuine
harm to children by diminishing the market for child pornography.46 In
response to the growth of the Internet and other innovative and evolving
technologies, Congress enacted the Child Pornography Prevention Act of
1996 (CPPA).47 The CPPA’s focus was on restricting child pornography
on the Internet, including virtual child pornography.48 The Ninth Circuit
stated that child pornography regulation altered from defining the crime
“in terms of the harm inflicted upon real children to a determination that
child pornography was evil in and of itself, whether it involved real
children or not.”49

37

Id. at 759.
Id. at 761.
39 Id. at 762.
40 Id. at 763.
41 Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
42 Wade T. Anderson, Criminalizing “Virtual” Child Pornography Under the Child
Pornography Prevention Act: Is It Really What It “Appears to Be?” 35 U. RICH. L. REV.
393, 396 (2001).
43 Pub. L. No. 100–690, 102 Stat. 4485 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251A2252 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
44 Anderson, supra note 42, at 397.
45 Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990).
46 Id. at 141–43.
47 Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121(1), 110
Stat. 3009–26 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (Supp. IV 1998)); see also Anderson, supra
note 42, at 403.
48 Anderson, supra note 42, at 403–04; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (Supp. V 1999).
49 Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. granted
sub nom. Holder v. Free Speech Coalition, 121 S. Ct. 876 (2001).
38
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Recent legislative and judicial responses to the proliferation of
child pornography have been strict.50 Criminal penalties for possessing
child pornography have also increased considerably.51 The underlying
dialogue pushing for increased sentences suggests that there is a
negligible difference between those who possess child pornography and
those who actually molest children.52 A fundamental thread throughout
this discourse is that regardless of the differences in penalties for child
pornography and child molestation, these two crimes are highly
intertwined based on the inherent danger both crimes present to innocent
children. 53 Finally, advancing forms of technology make it easier for
child pornographers to avoid detection. 54 Law enforcement personnel
face a formidable challenge when this opportunity for secrecy intersects
with individual liberties, such as privacy, which are protected by the
Fourth Amendment. This issue can be resolved by mildly conflating the
crimes of child molestation and child pornography. By doing so, the
ability to establish probable cause would be slightly expanded without
infringing on an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights.
C. Evolution of the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment protects a citizen from unreasonable
searches and seizures.55 It reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.56
Over the course of the past century, the United States saw a major
evolution of the Fourth Amendment and, more specifically, the probable
cause standard. The overarching theme of the Fourth Amendment
requires that a neutral magistrate be the one to draw evidentiary
inferences as opposed to a police officer “engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferretting out crime.”57 Beginning in 1933, the
Court announced that mere suspicion is not enough to support probable
50 Carissa Byrne Hessick, Disentangling Child Pornography from Child Sex Abuse,
88 WASH. U. L. REV. 853, 855 (2011) (discussing the rhetoric surrounding the link
between the crimes of child pornography and child sexual abuse).
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 854.
55 U.S. Const. amend. IV.
56 Id.
57 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948).
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cause to obtain a warrant to search a private dwelling. 58 The Court
required greater proof to protect individuals from overzealous law
enforcement agents entering a home without sufficient probable cause.59
In Illinois v. Gates, the Court stated that reviewing magistrates are
tasked with the responsibility of making “a practical, common-sense
decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . .
there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place.”60 Supreme Court precedent establishes that
the probable cause standard is not rigid. Rather, probable cause is an
imprecise concept that focuses on the realities “of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians act.”61 Because the
probable cause standard is fluid and nebulous, it can lead to a multitude
of problems in trying to obtain a search warrant.62 Inconsistency and
uncertainty abound when a law enforcement agent can submit an
affidavit to one magistrate judge and obtain a search warrant, yet be
denied a search warrant by a different magistrate judge evaluating the
same affidavit.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Intersection of Child Molestation and Child Pornography
A legal debate exists as to whether there is simply a correlation
between child molestation and child pornography or whether there is
actual causation between the two crimes. 63 This Comment seeks to
determine whether this debate is meaningless; even without evidence
supporting causation, if these two crimes are so highly correlated that
they are almost one and the same, should not evidence of one support
probable cause to locate evidence of the other? The Department of
Justice has suggested that, “[s]etting aside whether there is a causal
connection or even a correlation between child pornography and child
58

Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 47 (1933).
Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13–14.
60 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
61 Id. at 241 (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)).
62 Compare Colbert, 605 F.3d at 577 (8th Cir. 2010) (reasonably approving a search
of defendant’s home in order to locate child pornography when there was evidence the
defendant attempted to entice a young girl), with Falso, 544 F.3d at 124 (2d Cir. 2008)
(holding search for child pornography was not supported by probable cause where the
affidavit was based in part on evidence that defendant had previously been arrested for
sexually abusing a minor).
63 Alexandra Gelber, Response to “A Reluctant Rebellion,” U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 6
(2009),
available
at
http://www.ussc.gov/Education_and_Training/Annual_National_Training_Seminar/2010/
009c_Reluctant_Rebellion_Response.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2012).
59
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molestation, those who collect child pornography exploit and victimize
the children in those images, and create a demand for the production of
more child pornography . . . .”64
Further, a study conducted by Michael L. Bourke, of the United
States Marshals Service, and Andres E. Hernandez, of the Federal
Correction Institution located in Butner, North Carolina, gathered further
empirical evidence of the debate over the link between these two
categories of crime.65 The study analyzed two types of offenders: child
pornographers with no known “hands-on” sexual abuse history and child
pornographers known to have sexually abused at least one child victim.66
The objective of the study was to determine the likelihood of a child
pornographer engaging in child molestation.67 This was accomplished
by investigating what percentage of child pornographers were also
undetected child sexual abusers.68
The study’s findings revealed that the child pornographers were
“significantly more likely than not to have sexually abused a child.”69
This study also reported a 2,369% increase in the number of sexual abuse
offenses admitted by the subjects from the time of their sentencing to the
time of the study.70 This staggering percentage challenges the notion that
child pornographers only involve themselves with pictures and images of
children.71 Of the subjects who entered treatment with no known history
of sexual abuse offenses, less than two percent actually turned out to be
strictly child pornographers.72
The Butner Study calls into question whether it is realistic or useful
to distinguish child pornographers and child abusers.73 The authors of
the study believe that an intricate, shared relationship between these two
crimes exists.74 Further, the results of the study suggest that our society
may be faced with a new category of offenders: child pornographers
“may be undetected child molesters and . . . their use of child
pornography is indicative of their paraphilic orientation.”75
64 Id.; see also Mark Hansen, A Reluctant Rebellion, A.B.A. J. (2009), available at
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/a_reluctant_rebellion/ (last visited Nov. 7,
2012).
65 Bourke & Hernandez, supra note 3.
66 Id. at 183.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. (emphasis added).
70 Id. at 188.
71 Bourke & Hernandez, supra note 3, at 188.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 189.
75 Id. at 190.
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B. How This Problem Affects the Federal Circuits
Three leading cases sought to determine whether evidence of child
molestation could support probable cause to obtain a search warrant to
locate child pornography.76 They were all decided upon wholly different
factual foundations.77 Nevertheless, there is a common theme throughout
all three cases: each federal appellate court attempted to delicately
balance the critical need to protect innocent minors against the revered
privacy rights of the accused. 78 The uncertainty of this imprecise
balancing test creates confusion among the circuit courts, of which
clarity is desperately needed.
1. United States v. Colbert – Eighth Circuit
In United States v. Colbert,79 detectives investigated a complaint of
suspicious activity at a park when a young girl’s uncle witnessed an older
man speaking with his niece and became concerned.80 A description of
the man’s vehicle was relayed to the police who conducted a traffic stop
of the defendant.81 The defendant consented to a search of his car and
detectives discovered a police scanner, handcuffs, and a “New York PD”
hat. 82 To explain these possessions, the defendant stated that he had
previously worked as a security guard.83 He then admitted that he had
been talking to the young girl at the park about movies that he had at his
apartment.84
Subsequently, a search warrant affidavit was prepared to search the
defendant’s residence for evidence of child pornography.85 All of the
facts relating to the incident in the park, as well as the detectives’
interaction with the defendant were summarized in the warrant
application.86 A search warrant for the apartment was granted by the
magistrate and a search located children’s movies, a computer, and
numerous compact discs containing child pornography. 87
The

76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87

See cases cited supra note 4.
See cases cited supra note 4.
See cases cited supra note 4.
605 F.3d 573 (8th Cir. 2010) cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 1469 (2011).
Id. at 575.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Colbert, 605 F.3d at 575.
Id. at 575–76.
Id. at 576.
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defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence discovered in his home was
denied and he subsequently appealed.88
The district court addressed whether the facts set forth in the
affidavit, detailing the alleged enticement of a young girl, established a
link supporting probable cause to search the defendant’s home to locate
child pornography.89 The court determined that the affidavit did in fact
establish probable cause to search the home for child pornography
because “individuals sexually interested in children frequently utilize
child pornography to reduce the inhibitions of their victims.” 90 More
specifically, the court asserted that child pornography was logically
related to child enticement, particularly when a defendant had
specifically referred to movies and videos that he wanted the child to
view.91
The district court found that the reviewing magistrate reasonably
concluded the search of Colbert’s home was justified, notwithstanding
the affidavit’s lack of detail. 92 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed this holding, rationalizing that an intuitive relationship exists
between child molestation or enticement and possession of child
pornography. 93 The circuit court explained that child pornography
possession is a logical precursor to child molestation and that this
relationship is worsened due to the ubiquitous nature of child
pornography on the Internet. 94 The easy access to Internet child
pornography creates a discrete way for child molesters to secretly satisfy
their pedophilic desires.95
The dissenting opinion was concerned about the majority’s reliance
on what it called a “dangerous assumption” in affirming the validity of
the search warrant. 96 The dissent believed that the affidavit strictly
supported probable cause regarding child enticement and not possession
of child pornography.97 The dissent also noted the magistrate judge’s
deduction of a nexus between child enticement and child pornography,
without additional evidence supporting that inference, was

88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97

Id.
Id. at 576–77.
Id. at 577.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 577–78.
Id. at 578.
Id.
Id. at 579 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 580.
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unreasonable.98 The dissent primarily relied on two cases: United States
v. Hodson99 and United States v. Falso.100
2. United States v. Hodson – Sixth Circuit
On October 7, 2005, a police detective conducted a search for
online sexual predators by signing on to the Internet under the alias
“kidlatino12” and pretending to be a twelve year-old boy. 101 The
detective encountered another user under the alias “WhopperDaddy”
who confided to the detective that he was a forty-one year-old married
father of two sons.102 “WhopperDaddy” also confessed that he was a
homosexual with a preference for young boys, that he enjoyed seeing his
sons naked, and that he had sex with his seven year-old nephew.103 Next,
“WhopperDaddy” told the twelve-year-old male alias that he was
interested in performing oral sex on him.104 America Online (“AOL”)
identification records revealed that the ‘WhopperDaddy’ screen name
was registered to Michael Hodson.105
It was subsequently discovered that Hodson was the father of only
one son and had no nephews. 106 An affidavit to search Hodson’s
residence was prepared based on the AOL identification information and
the Internet conversation. 107 The affidavit requested a search for
evidence of child pornography; however, the statement of probable cause
failed to allege any involvement by the defendant in child pornography
other than the Internet communications. 108 Likewise, there was no
evidence supporting the notion that child molesters are also likely to
possess child pornography. 109 Nonetheless, a warrant was issued and
Hodson’s residence was searched by law enforcement.110 Police located
numerous pictures of child pornography buried in the hard drives of
Hodson’s computer, but did not discover or seize any evidence to support
a charge of child molestation against Hodson.111

98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111

Id. at 580–81 (citing Hodson, 543 F.3d at 293 (6th Cir. 2008)).
543 F.3d 286 (6th Cir. 2008).
544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008).
Hodson, 543 F.3d at 287.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hodson, 543 F.3d at 287.
Id. at 288–289.
Id. at 289.
Id.
Id.
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Hodson was indicted for receiving and possessing child
pornography and subsequently filed a motion to suppress the evidence
seized during the search.112 The reviewing magistrate judge focused on
the “molestation-pornography nexus,” and concluded there was a lack of
evidence linking Hodson to child pornography. 113 The magistrate
determined there was a weak inference that Hodson viewed child
pornography solely based on the fact that he allegedly enjoyed seeing his
children unclothed.114 The magistrate judge declared that to infer that
Hodson possessed child pornography would require an assumption that
suspected child molesters always possess child pornography.115
The magistrate declined to make that assumption because he was
not persuaded that Hodson possessed child pornography based solely on
evidence that he was an alleged child molester.116 The magistrate judge
was influenced by dicta in United States v. Adkins117 in concluding that
the online conversation, although repugnant, did not create a link
between child molestation and pornography possession. 118 The
magistrate added, however, that had the detective included her expertise
on the nexus between the two crimes in the affidavit, such an empirical
link might have been reached.119
With regard to the government’s argument that the officer’s
reliance on the search warrant was made in good faith, the magistrate
found that while the detective’s failure to provide evidence supporting
the critical link undercut the warrant, it was not made in bad faith.120
Further, the magistrate held that the validity of the warrant was not
completely destroyed by the lack of a nexus between the two crimes
because both the conduct described and the evidence sought involved
sexual exploitation of minors.121
The district court conducted a hearing based on both parties’
objections to the magistrate’s findings.122 Because the detective did not
include the necessary expertise to establish a link between child
molestation and child pornography possession, the district court found
112

Id.
Hodson, 543 F.3d at 290.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 United States v. Adkins, 169 F. App’x 961, 967 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Standing alone, a
high incidence of child molestation by persons convicted of child pornography crimes
may not demonstrate that a child molester is likely to possess child pornography.”).
118 Hodson, 543 F.3d at 290–91.
119 Id. at 291.
120 Hodson, 543 F.3d at 291.
121 Id.
122 Id.
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the warrant defective for lack of probable cause. 123 Next, the court
applied the Leon good faith exception and concluded that the affidavit
contained information demonstrating that the defendant was engaged in
child molestation and illicit online activity.124 Both of these activities
involve sexual exploitation of minors and, as such, are closely linked to
possession of child pornography.125 Therefore, the district court denied
the motion to suppress and Hodson subsequently appealed.126
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, relying heavily on Adkins
concluded that it was unreasonable for the magistrate judge to infer the
nexus between child pornography and child molestation without
additional evidence.127 Further, the court of appeals, unlike the district
court, did not adhere to the Leon good faith exception, stating that it was
also unreasonable for the police officer to infer the nexus herself or to
rely on her own subjective knowledge of the nexus between the two
crimes.128 Thus, the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress was
reversed, Hodson’s conviction was vacated, and the case was
remanded.129
3. United States v. Falso – Second Circuit
United States v. Falso130 is yet another circuit court case that blurs
the probable cause standard in relation to child molestation and child
pornography. The defendant moved to suppress evidence of child
pornography seized from his home on the grounds that probable cause
for the search did not exist. 131 The lower court denied this motion,
finding that probable cause existed and that the “good-faith” exception
applied.132 The issue presented on appeal was whether the lower court’s
finding of probable cause existed when it was based on a search warrant
stating that the defendant may have attempted to gain access to a child
pornography website.133 The search warrant affidavit also noted that the
defendant had an eighteen year-old conviction for sexual abuse of a
minor.134 The Second Circuit found that although the defendant did try
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Id. at 291–92.
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to gain access to the child pornography website, he was not a registered
member of the site. 135 Therefore, the question on appeal hinged on
whether the defendant’s eighteen year-old conviction for sexual abuse of
a minor could support a belief that evidence of child pornography would
be found in his home.136 The court held that probable cause was lacking,
but that the good-faith exception applied.137
In evaluating whether the affidavit supported probable cause in this
case, the Second Circuit first looked to the illustrated nexus between
child pornography and child molestation.138 The Second Circuit believed
that the line of reasoning asserted in the affidavit, that the majority of
child pornography possessors are persons who are sexually attracted to
children, was illogical.139 Relying on the dissenting opinion in United
States v. Martin140 the court concluded that “it is an inferential fallacy of
ancient standing to conclude that, because members of group A (those
who collect child pornography) are likely to be members of group B
(those attracted to children), then group B is entirely, or even largely
composed of, members of group A.”141 Thus, the court held that even
though the lower court was understandably concerned with public safety,
an individual’s Fourth Amendment right cannot be destroyed because of
illogical inferences drawn from unsupported facts.142
The court then discussed whether the defendant’s prior sex-crime
conviction was relevant to the probable cause analysis. 143 The court
determined that because there was no evidence of ongoing impropriety,
the temporal gap was not bridged between the eighteen year-old
conviction and the current alleged child pornography offense.144 Further,
the court stated, although the prior conviction involved the sexual abuse
of a minor, it was not a conviction for possession of child
pornography.145 The court demanded that it is not enough that the law
criminalizes both of the aforementioned crimes; the two misconducts are

135

Id. at 113.
Falso, 544 F.3d at 113.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 117–20.
139 Id. at 122.
140 426 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2005).
141 Falso, 544 F.3d at 122 (quoting Martin, 426 F.3d at 82 (Pooler, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority’s inference that because collectors of child pornography are
likely to be subscribers of e-groups, the inverse also is true: namely, that subscribers are
likely to collect child pornography)).
142 Falso, 544 F.3d at 122.
143 Id. at 122–123.
144 Id. at 123.
145 Id.
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separate crimes. 146 Because the search warrant did not provide the
needed correlation between a person’s inclinations to commit both types
of crimes, the Second Circuit found that probable cause did not exist.147
IV. OPTIMAL SOLUTION
A. Expanded Probable Cause Standard Limited to Child Sexual
Exploitation Situations
In order to resolve the disagreement among the federal circuit
courts on this issue, the Supreme Court should develop an expanded
probable cause standard limited to child sexual exploitation situations
when certain requirements are met. This type of expansion would not be
novel, as it is already used consistently and analogously in cases where
law enforcement seek to find evidence in the home of an individual
suspected of association with drugs.148 Therefore, because of the severity
of crimes dealing with child endangerment, an expanded probable cause
standard, allowing evidence of certain child sexual exploitation crimes to
support probable cause for a search for child pornography, is warranted
by societal norms.
B. Existing Judicial Precedent of Probable Cause Standard as a
Foundation
The analysis of this new standard should not be undertaken without
context and reviewing magistrates should continue to take into account
judicial precedent when determining whether the probable cause standard
has been met. One important aspect that cannot be overlooked is the
notion, developed in Johnson v. United States, 149 that evidentiary
inferences should be drawn by a “neutral and detached magistrate,” as
opposed to a law enforcement “officer engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime.”150 This requirement does not deny law
enforcement the benefit of reasonable inferences; it simply places that
control in the hands of an impartial magistrate as opposed to a potentially
zealous police officer.151
Additionally, magistrates should continue to abide by the “totality
of the circumstances” approach developed in Gates to determine when

146
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See supra note 20; see discussion infra Part IV, B.
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probable cause exists.152 By rejecting the rigid Aguilar-Spinelli153 twopronged test, the Supreme Court in Gates adopted an all-encompassing
“totality of the circumstances” standard.154 The standard states that the
issuing magistrate’s task is to “make a practical, common-sense decision
whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him,
there is a fair probability that . . . evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place.” 155 The Supreme Court hoped that this flexible and
functional standard would better achieve the equilibrium of “public and
private interests that the Fourth Amendment requires.”156
C. Analogous Situations of an Expansion of the Probable Cause
Standard
There are many examples of situations in which courts allow a
loose interpretation of the probable cause standard in evaluating
affidavits related to crimes involving drugs. 157 The Sixth Circuit
declared that depending on the crime being investigated, evidence
sought, and the opportunity for concealment of evidence, a magistrate
judge may deduce a link between a suspect and a location to be
searched. 158 Many circuits have also held that judges may infer that
suspected criminals are likely to retain evidence of their crimes in their
homes.159
An example of this loosened probable cause interpretation is
evident in United States v. Pace, where police officers observed
marijuana plants growing inside a barn located on the defendant Pace’s
152 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (“The rigid ‘two-pronged test’ under Aguilar
[v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964)] and Spinelli [v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969)] for
determining whether an informant’s tip establishes probable cause for issuance of a
warrant is abandoned, and the ‘totality of the circumstances’ approach that traditionally
has informed probable-cause determinations is substituted in its place.”).
153 Aguilar v. Texas , 378 U.S. 108 (1964) abrogated by Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213 (1983) (“Although an affidavit . . . need not reflect the direct personal observations
of the affiant . . . the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying
circumstances from which the informant concluded that the [evidence was] where he
claimed [it was], and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer
concluded that the informant, whose identity need not be disclosed . . . was ‘credible’ or
his information ‘reliable.’”); and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969)
abrogated by Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
154 Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 239.
157 See supra note 20.
158 United States v. Williams, 544 F.3d 683, 687 (2008) (citing United States v.
Savoca, 761 F.2d 292, 298 (6th Cir. 1985)).
159 Id. at 688 (citing United States v. Jones, 994 F.2d 1051, 1056 (3d Cir. 1993);
United States v. Anderson, 851 F.2d 727, 729 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
1031 (1989)).
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property.160 Based on the information obtained from a legal search of the
barn, additional warrants were issued for Pace’s residences. 161 The
search warrant affidavit stated that people who grow marijuana often
keep contraband, proceeds, and records hidden in their homes to prevent
police detection. 162 Subsequent searches of the residences revealed a
plethora of documents relating to drug transactions, as well as certain
drug paraphernalia, including marijuana and cash. 163 Pace was
subsequently indicted for conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to
distribute.164
The Fifth Circuit analyzed the holding of United States v.
Freeman, 165 which stated, that search warrant affidavits must contain
facts establishing a “nexus between the house to be searched and the
evidence sought.”166 The court expounded that while the affidavit must
link the location to be searched with the alleged illegal activity, the
connection could be founded on ordinary “inferences as to where the
sought out evidence would normally be located.” 167 The Pace court
concluded that probable cause was supported to search the defendant’s
home based on the fact that a link was established between the illegal
activity and the belief that certain evidence would be located at the
defendant’s home.168 This case illustrates the importance of expressly
explaining and clearly delineating the connection between the specific,
alleged criminal activity and the likelihood of locating evidence of a
separate criminal activity in a particular location.
United States v. Feliz 169 presents another analogous situation in
which a court employed an expanded probable cause standard to find a
nexus between alleged criminal activity and evidence to be found at the
particular location. In Feliz, officers submitted an affidavit containing
detailed information demonstrating that the defendant was involved in
illegal drug trafficking.170 The defendant argued that the drug sales did
not occur at or near his apartment and moreover, that the police officer’s
extensive experience in drug trafficking activity was inadequate to
supply the required nexus to support probable cause.171 The First Circuit
160
161
162
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164
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United States v. Pace, 955 F.2d 270, 272 (5th Cir.1992).
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685 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 276 (quoting United States v. Freeman, 685 F.2d 942, 949 (5th Cir. 1982).
Pace, 955 F.2d at 277.
Id.
182 F.3d 82, 86 (1999).
Id. at 87.
Id.

212

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 9:30

Court of Appeals disagreed with this contention.172 The court stated that
by analyzing an affidavit using a commonsense and realistic approach,
probable cause could be inferred that criminal objects may be located in
a particular place even when not linked by direct evidence. 173
Ultimately, the court held that it was reasonable for the judge to rely on
her commonsense, along with the affiant’s professional law enforcement
opinion, to determine that it was likely that defendant would have
evidence of drug trafficking transactions at his home.174
Last, in United States v. Nance, 175 a suspect purchased drugs from
an undercover police officer. After he was arrested, a search warrant was
obtained to search his home for drug paraphernalia, money, and
weapons.176 Firearms were indeed located in the defendant’s home.177
The defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence claiming that it
was illegally seized based on lack of probable cause. 178 While the
underlying affidavit contained information wholly regarding defendant’s
criminal drug activity, the final sentence added that based on the law
enforcement officer’s professional experience and opinion, drug dealers
keep weapons in their homes.179 Based on this, the Ninth Circuit held
that the affidavit established probable cause to support the warrant.180
The preceding cases demonstrate that courts have loosely
interpreted the probable cause standard in certain situations relating to
drug crimes. The magistrates involved issued warrants to locate
evidence of a crime without any direct proof that the evidence would be
located in the defendants’ homes. Subjective testimony from law
enforcement officials based on their experience and training, as well as,
common sense inferences made by the neutral and detached magistrates
allowed for these search warrants to be approved. 181 If the probable
cause standard can be broadened to account for these specific drug
related crimes, it should also be broadened for inherently dangerous
crimes involving child sexual exploitation.
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D. The Uniqueness of Child Pornography Offenders and Why the
Probable Cause Standard Should be Broadened in Relation to
Child Sexual Exploitation Crimes
The effect of sweeping technological advances on modern
American society has forced the law to adapt.182 It is imperative that
criminal laws also evolve to maintain pace with progressing
technology. 183 While the child pornography industry is not new, the
emergence of the Internet and advancements in computer technology
have transformed it into a global industry. 184 The anonymity of the
Internet only exacerbates the problem of child pornography.185 On one
hand, law enforcement officials’ success in locating and arresting child
pornographers depends on their ability to remain informed of innovative
technological advances. 186 On the other hand, legislative and judicial
decisions also tend to dictate the efficacy of law enforcement officials in
apprehending and prosecuting possessors of Internet child
pornography.187 Thus, all three branches of government must take great
efforts to ensure the equilibrium between sacred individual privacy
interests and concerns surrounding dangerous crimes of sexual
exploitation and abuse of innocent children.
Typically, defendants who engage in child pornography present a
complex and unique barrier to law enforcement discovery. Child
pornographers go to great lengths to hide their crimes, thereby making
detection of child pornography immensely difficult.188 Often, it is not
until after an individual is arrested for the more severe crime of child

182 Amy E. Wells, Criminal Procedure: The Fourth Amendment Collides with the
Problem of Child Pornography and the Internet, 53 OKLA. L. REV. 99, 99 (2000); see
generally Randolph S. Sergent, A Fourth Amendment Model for Computer Networks and
Data Privacy, 81 VA. L. REV. 1181 (1995) (focusing on how “the development of modern
communications technology forces [society] . . . to [reestablish] the balance between
individual privacy and society’s need for information”).
183 Wells, 53 OKLA. L. REV. at 100.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 101 (citing Jennifer Stewart, If This Is the Global Community, We Must Be
on the Bad Side of Town: International Policing of Child Pornography on the Internet,
20 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 205, 215 (1997) (“A person can establish a bulletin board, and use it
to exchange sexual interests in children, without a license or registration.”) and John R.
Levine et al., The Internet for Dummies, 218, 225 (5th ed. 1998) (“A person can reroute
e-mail and graphic images through multiple nations so that the origin of the file is
virtually undetectable.”))
186 Wells, 53 OKLA. L. REV. at 107.
187 Id.
188 Dr. Tory J. Caeti, Ph.D., Sex Crimes, Part I: Child Pornography, 18, Law
Enforcement
Training
Network
(2009),
available
at
http://www.twlk.com/law/tests/letn1640102ct.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2012).
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sexual abuse, that possession of child pornography is discovered.189 In
this way, law enforcement efforts are reactive as opposed to proactive
about responding to this evolving social crisis.
The judiciary’s willingness to adopt a broadened probable cause
standard in drug-related crimes might be a result of the amorphous “War
on Drugs” and law enforcement efforts to reduce the illegal drug trade.190
While reducing and eliminating the illegal drug trade is of great
importance, there is no reason why its expanded probable cause standard
cannot be extended to crimes involving child sexual exploitation. The
historical development of child pornography laws demonstrates that
mainstream society consider crimes involving child sexual exploitation
to be abhorrent and dangerous. 191 Moreover, the most unique
characteristic of child molesters is their gripping interest in child
pornography. 192 Thus, for many child molesters, child pornography
serves as a facilitator to commit child molestation.193
The two competing interests in this debate are: the sanctity of the
individual’s privacy in the home versus the overwhelming concern for
the protection of children. This is an arduous balancing act due to the
high value United States citizens place on individualized privacy
interests; the privacy of one’s home is considered sacrosanct. 194 In
considering these two competing interests, the judiciary’s decisions
should favor protecting children. Child pornography presents a severe
threat to children, who are inherently incapable of protecting themselves.
This proposed expanded probable cause standard would not provide
carte blanche freedom to law enforcement officials in obtaining search
warrants. Affidavits must include specific, detailed criteria, such as: (1)
a clear history, including examples, of training and experience of the
affiant in establishing and determining probable cause; (2) a detailed
description of reliable statistical data reflecting the strong correlation
between specific child sexual exploitation crimes; and (3) a clear,
delineated nexus between the first two elements and the particular place
to be searched. The inclusion of these specific details combined with a
common sense, practical application by a neutral and detached magistrate
will provide sufficient probable cause to search for child pornography in
an individual’s home with or without direct evidence.
189
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E. Practical Ramifications of Implementing a Broadened Probable
Cause Standard
Implementing this broadened standard has the potential to create
more efficiency within the law enforcement arena, as well as, provide a
more manageable standard to combat a highly secretive and extremely
dangerous crime. Because of the exceptionally high level of danger child
molesters and child pornographers pose to our society, this expansion is
appropriate. Courts are not unaccustomed to altering and expanding the
probable cause standard. For example, in Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme
Court denounced the suggestion of a “rigid, all-or-nothing model of
justification and regulation under the [Fourth] Amendment.”195
The Terry court declared that there is no clear definition for what
constitutes a reasonable search, but rather that the need for the search
must be weighed against the invasion of the search.196 In order to justify
the imposition, law enforcement must have precise and articulable facts
to reasonably warrant the intrusion.197 The Court stated that an inflexible
approach “obscures the utility of limitations upon the scope . . . of police
action as a means of constitutional regulation.” 198 Thus, Terry
announced a new standard allowing “a reasonable search for weapons for
the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he
is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether
he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime.”199 The Court
focused on the notion that law enforcement officers are entitled to draw
specific, reasonable inferences from certain facts in light of their
experiences. 200 The “reasonableness” concept pronounced in Terry
supports a mild expansion of the probable cause standard in narrow
circumstances involving child sexual exploitation.
In contrast, the potential danger of this broadened approach is that it
could open the floodgates to similar treatment of other crimes. Giving
certain crimes more weight based on the societal interest in preventing
that crime could result in a weakening of the safeguards envisioned by
the framers of the Fourth Amendment. This issue could be exacerbated
if the respective weights are determined by over-zealous, though perhaps
well-intentioned, police officers instead of a neutral and detached
magistrate judge. Nevertheless, if the expanded probable cause standard
is safeguarded in harmony with the Supreme Court’s consistent refusal to
195
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intrude upon constitutionally guaranteed rights, then a limited expansion
for inherently dangerous child sexual exploitation crimes is warranted.
V. CONCLUSION
While it remains true that child molestation and child pornography
are two separate crimes, and that the seriousness of one crime should
never be primarily based on evidence of the other, there is overwhelming
evidence that these two types of crimes are strongly correlated. One
detective in the Los Angeles, California police department estimated that
more than half of the roughly 700 child molesters he had arrested
possessed child pornography at the time of arrest.201 Additionally, thenSenator Joe Biden stated during a congressional hearing that the heart of
this discussion boils down to a very candid notion: children used in the
production of child pornography are sexual abuse victims at the hands of
the pornographers. 202 Further, the growing capabilities of the Internet
and the novel ways that child pornography possessors can hide images
and deceive law enforcement creates an impossibly difficult issue;
traditional investigative techniques are becoming less useful in
preventing the victimization of innocent children.
Thus, while child pornographers do not fit precisely into any
existing, traditional Fourth Amendment category, a response by the
judiciary in formulating a broadened probable cause standard in order to
search for child pornography is the United States’ best attempt at
combating the societal danger created by this type of crime. The
expanded probable cause standard is by no means attempting to
unconstitutionally interfere with sexual activity between two consenting
adults in the privacy of their own home. 203 On the contrary, this
expanded standard applies to a unique area of law where society has
clearly drawn special, protective boundaries in order to safeguard
innocent child victims. While this modest expansion of the probable
cause standard may appear to conflict with Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court constantly attempts to strike a balance
between compelling government interests and individual privacy
rights.204 Inevitably, with every valid search based on probable cause,
201 Michael Reagan, Child Porn is Child Abuse. I Know Because it Happened to Me,
(Dec. 9, 2010), available at http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2010/12/09/michaelreagan-child-pornography-child-abuse-know-happened/#ixzz1Zeyr1pEG (last visited
Nov. 7, 2012).
202 142 Cong. Rec. S-11900 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Biden).
203 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186 (1986) and holding that a Texas statute banning same sex sodomy was
unconstitutional).
204 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
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there is the possibility of a slight invasion of privacy; however, in order
to combat inherently dangerous crimes involving child sexual
exploitation, this limited expansion is the fair and just result. By
emulating the existing expansion of the probable cause standard for drugrelated crimes, the judiciary can create an efficient and more uniform
conception of determining probable cause for crimes relating to child
sexual exploitation.

